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Table 1. Eligibility conditions and benefit rates for Belgian sickness and disability  




1. Introduction  
Belgium faces long-lasting challenges regarding the labour market activation of vulnerable 
groups, including sick and disabled people, notably due to persisting inactivity traps and 
disincentives to work (Hufkens et al., 2016). Only three out of four people of working age (20-64) 
are active in the labour market (74.5%), which is below the EU average of 78.7% in 2019 
(European Commission, 2019). Sickness and disability have become significant reasons for 
inactivity: the share of inactive people not seeking employment due to their own illness or 
disability increased from 10.7% in 2007 to 19.1% in 20191. Furthermore, the share of private 
sector salaried employees who were absent from work as a result of long-term illness increased 
exponentially from 2010, and now continues to do so at a slower rate (Securex, 2018). Only part 
of this increase can be explained by an ageing population and increased eligibility for social 
assistance due to higher female labour market participation (Saks, 2017).  
Meanwhile, before the Covid-19 pandemic, labour market shortages had become more acute, 
creating skills shortages and impeding the smooth functioning of the labour market. This is 
especially the case in Flanders, where in 2018 there was a one-to-one ratio of jobseekers to 
vacancies (European Commission, 2019). Indeed, as reported recently by Statistics Belgium, the 
unemployment patterns show differences across the three regions in Belgium, with Flanders 
having the lowest unemployment rate (3%) compared to Wallonia (7%) and Brussels-Capital 
(12%) in 2019.2 
More specifically, chronic diseases pose important challenges for the proper functioning of labour 
markets in Belgium. They are associated with stigma and taboos, and often lead to social 
exclusion. We understand chronic diseases as diseases of long duration and generally slow 
progression, which can be divided into several types: cardiovascular diseases (CVD), cancers, 
diabetes, chronic respiratory diseases, musculoskeletal diseases (MSD) and mental diseases 
(Akgüç et al., 2020). These categories are selected because they produce a considerable burden 
on the workforce and are the main cause of morbidity and mortality in the European Union 
(Guazzi et al., 2014). According to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice,3 principles 
of non-discrimination based on disability and the associated duty to proceed to reasonable 
accommodations apply to people suffering from a long-term illness (Eurofound, 2019). A Belgian 
court applied the same principle to employees with a long-term illness for the first time in 
February 2018 (CSC, 2019). It should be noted here that Belgian legislation uses the concept of 
invalidity more than disability (CNT, 2015). 
The issue of chronic diseases is particularly acute in Belgium, where musculoskeletal and mental 
health problems are the first causes of absenteeism. These categories explain about two thirds of 
the significant increase in long-term sick leave and represent 67.31% of sickness and disability 
insurance beneficiaries (Mutualités Libres, 2019b). According to a study conducted by Mutualités 
Libres (2019c) between 2013 and 2017, more than half of “new” disability insurance beneficiaries 
 
1 Source: Eurostat, lfsa_igar, extracted 15th December 2020. 
2 For more details of the latest Belgian Labour Force Survey results reported by StatBel, see 
https://statbel.fgov.be/en/themes/work-training/labour-market/employment-and-unemployment. 
3 European Court of Justice - Joined Cases C-335/11 and C-337/11. 
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were already suffering from at least one chronic disease, depression being the most frequent one. 
On the other hand, the incidence of other types of chronic conditions such as cardiovascular 
disease and cancer has decreased (Saks, 2017).  
Moreover, people suffering from a chronic condition in Belgium tend to face significant difficulties 
in terms of integration into the labour market and wellbeing. The gap in the at-risk-of-poverty-or-
social-exclusion rate between people with and without disabilities amounts to 17.7 percentage 
points, which is significantly higher than the EU average of 9.7 percentage points (European 
Commission, 2018). In 2018, the employment rate of people with disabilities (aged 20-64) was 
31.6%, ranging between 31.1% in Brussels and 46% in Flanders.  
The increasing incidence of long-term incapacity for work has led to mounting social security 
costs, which is perceived as a threat to the sustainability of the social security system. Indeed, 
spending on disability increased from 1.9% of GDP in 2005 to 2.6% in 2016 (Pacolet, 2019). In 
2018, combined spending on disability and sickness benefits exceeded spending on 
unemployment benefits for the first time. This may be due to a “communicating vessels” effect 
between the various schemes for early withdrawal from the labour market, as early retirement 
schemes and the exemption of “older unemployed persons” from seeking work have gradually 
been phased out (Pacolet, 2019).  
This evolution is reflected in the Belgian government’s increasing concern over the risk of 
incapacity for work. Increased awareness of this issue has been noticed over the past decade, 
with a switch from welfare to workfare also in the area of incapacity (Houwing and Vandaele, 
2011). Since 2015, the government has sought to address the economic impact of sickness 
absence and mismanagement of return to work leading to unemployment, disability pensions or 
early retirement. Notably, mutualities or mutual insurance providers (mutuelles/mutualiteits) are 
pushed to increase the employment rate among long-term sickness insurance beneficiaries and 
incentivise return to work. New pieces of legislation on work reintegration also address the 
challenge of supporting workers with chronic disease(s) in their return to work, when this is 
feasible (i.e. they are “able” and have the “capacity” to get back to work) (Securex, 2018).  
This context makes Belgium a relevant case study to understand the evolution in return to work 
policy and practices, even more so given its industrial relations and welfare state regimes. Indeed, 
Belgium has a strong tradition of a Bismarckian continental welfare system, corporatist 
arrangements and social pacts as solutions in case of social conflict (Houwing and Vandaele, 
2011). The Belgian industrial relations system is characterised by a strong role of social partners, 
a high but declining union density rate and large collective bargaining coverage. Unions are 
involved in social security management in what is called the “Ghent system”. Dialogue with the 
state also plays an important role in the social dialogue process. 
As part of the REWIR research project, the present report will seek to determine the role that 
industrial relations play in Belgium at national and company level in designing and implementing 
return to work policies. The report relies on a multiplicity of data sources and methodologies. As 
the analytical framework of the REWIR project is based on the concept of actor-centred 
institutionalism (Scharpf, 1997), the report focuses on the role that stakeholders play in shaping 
policies. Stakeholders and their perceptions and experiences are at the core of the analysis. 
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Therefore, this report mostly relies on qualitative data collected via six interviews, two focus 
groups with federal-level representatives of employers and trade unions (Annex, Table 7) and one 
roundtable discussion conducted with relevant national stakeholders (Annex, Tables 5 and 6). The 
report is also based on three small sample size surveys respectively targeted at workers, 
companies and national social partners (Annex, Tables 1-4). Given the limited representativeness 
of the survey samples, we triangulated our findings with the above-mentioned qualitative data 
collected and additional desk research using policy documents, opinions from the National Labour 
Council and academic literature on the topic. 
This report is structured as follows: section 2 outlines the policy framework on return to work in 
Belgium, including a description of the sickness and invalidity benefit system, and of the 
provisions supporting rehabilitation for employment. Section 3 evaluates how social partners 
shape and view policy on return to work at national level, based on the interviews, stakeholder 
discussion groups and social partner survey performed in the realm of this study. Focusing on 
return to work at company level and the involvement of social partners, section 4 analyses the 
results of the worker survey and manager survey implemented for this study. A final section 
concludes and draws some recommendations regarding return to work in Belgium and the role 
of social partners.  
2. The policy framework on return to work in Belgium 
This section analyses the policy framework on rehabilitation and return to work in Belgium. 
Belgium is classified by EU-OSHA (2016) as part of the group of European countries together with 
France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. They are characterised 
by well-developed frameworks for rehabilitation and return to work, but with limited 
coordination between the different stakeholders. Return to work is considered at the end of the 
sickness absence and with limited possibility of early intervention. Nevertheless, recent policy 
developments have shifted the Belgian approach towards return to work.  
2.1 Sickness and invalidity benefit system 
Belgium can be categorised as a mix between a Bismarckian and a Beveridgian welfare regime 
(SPF Sécurité Sociale, 2018). It has a “pillarised” social security system with separate regimes for 
salaried workers (sometimes differentiated by blue-collar and white-collar workers), self-
employed and civil servants (Pacolet, 2019). Trade unions, mutual insurance providers and 
employers’ organisations co-decide about various aspects of these social security regimes. Each 
regime has a different framework and coverage regarding sickness, disability insurance and return 
to work. Different regimes also exist depending on the cause of the illness: if the sick leave is due 
to an occupational accident or occupational disease, the Federal Agency for Occupational Risks 
(FEDRIS) is responsible. The National Institute for Health and Disability Insurance (RIVIZ - INAMI - 
NIHDI) is the federal institution responsible for non-occupational illness. This report will focus on 
the schemes coordinated by the NIHDI for salaried workers.  
The National Institute for Health and Disability Insurance (NIHDI) is responsible for the 
coordination of sickness and disability insurance benefits. It also takes decisions on individual 
cases, such as access to a vocational rehabilitation programme. It works in collaboration with 
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accredited mutual insurance providers, who act as intermediaries between the NIHDI and the 
insured. They serve as paying agents on behalf of the NIHDI and as key gatekeepers in the access 
to sickness and disability benefits (OECD, 2013). Furthermore, social security remains a core 
federal competence, while sub-federal levels are responsible for employment matters, including 
activation policies and training. This means that coordination between different policy levels on 
return to work policies is needed. The federal legislation is implemented in coordination with the 
Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia regions.  
Unlike in most other countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), sickness and disability benefits in Belgium are integrated into one single system managed 
by the NIHDI. Work incapacity is divided into two periods: the primary work incapacity (incapacité 
de travail primaire/ primaire ongeschiktheid), corresponding to sickness benefits during the first 
year of sickness; and the period of invalidity (invalidité/ invaliditeit), which corresponds to 
disability benefits and starts after one year of incapacity.  
First, the employee on sick leave receives a guaranteed salary during the first month of sickness 
absence (or 15 days for blue-collar workers) paid by his or her employer. After the first month 
and the declaration of incapacity via a medical certificate, the NIHDI takes over the management 
of the benefits. At the start of the incapacity period, the mutuality doctor proceeds to the 
determination of the degree of incapacity and the duration. The incapacity benefit covers 60% of 
the worker’s salary, with a maximum annual amount determined according to the starting year 
of the incapacity. After the seventh month of incapacity, a medical officer carries out a medical 
evaluation of the beneficiary to check if he or she still fulfils the medical criteria.  
After one year of incapacity, the invalidity period is established and prolonged by the Invalidity 
Medical Council of the NIHDI (Conseil médical de l'invalidité / Geneeskundige raad 
voor invaliditeit) on the basis of a medical report written by the mutuality doctor. The payment 
of invalidity benefits can continue until retirement age depending on the evolution of the 
employee’s health condition. The amount of the invalidity benefits depends on the family 
situation and the starting date of the incapacity.  
Table 1 below sums up the eligibility and characteristics of the incapacity and invalidity insurance 
schemes. During the period of incapacity for work, the beneficiary is not allowed to work, unless 
permission to work part time is granted by the mutuality doctor. Sometimes, a benefit may be 
refused or reduced if the person receives a supplementary disability allowance. The invalidity 
period is not interrupted by a return to work of less than three months, in case of relapse. In 2018, 
incapacity benefits amounted to €1.8 billion and invalidity benefits to €5.8 billion. Between 2013 
and 2018, invalidity benefits increased by 7.8% yearly on average (Mutualités Libres based on 
data from the NIHDI, 2019).  
Disabled people with a reduced earning capacity can be eligible for two non-contributory and 
means-tested disability allowances from the Federal Public Service for Social Security (SPF Affaires 
Sociales), namely income replacement allowance and integration allowance. Unemployment 
benefits can also be an important source of income for people suffering from chronic diseases 
and incapacity. The payment of unemployment benefits is organised at federal level by the 
National Employment Office (RVA/ONEM), while regional employment services (VDAB in 
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Flanders, Actiris in Brussels and Forem in Wallonia) are responsible for job placement and active 
labour market policies. 
Table 1. Eligibility conditions and benefit rates for Belgian sickness and disability insurance 
scheme for salaried workers on sick leave 
Eligibility Incapacity benefits: 180 days of work (paid vacation and sick 
leave included) during a period of six months prior to obtaining 
benefits; minimum contributory requirements (obligation to prove 
a sufficient amount of social contributions); loss of earnings 
capacity of 66% or more as a result of injuries or functional 
difficulties. 
Invalidity benefit: depending on a medical examination by the 
NIHDI medical officer, after one year of receiving incapacity 
benefits. 
Duration Incapacity benefits: first year of absence 
Invalidity benefits: after one year of absence. Depends on the 
evaluation of the invalidity by the Medical Invalidity Council of the 
NIHDI on the basis of the advice of the mutuality doctor, as well as 
on the evolution of the illness. 
Source of payment Contribution-based, paid by the NIHDI. 
Level of benefits  Incapacity benefit: 60% of previous earnings. 
Invalidity benefit: either 65% (person with dependants), 55% 
(single person) or 40% (cohabitant) of previous earnings. 
Timing of return to work 
considerations 
A formal reintegration procedure can be initiated after one month 
of absence. The mutuality doctor needs to assess the return to 
work prospects of the employee within two months of the start of 
the incapacity. 
Procedures to return to 
work 
 Informal reintegration (visit to the occupational physician) 
 Formal reintegration procedure (since 2016) 
 Vocational rehabilitation 
 Medical part time 
 Voluntary work 
Type of source of these 
provisions (e.g. law 
(dedicated or general), 
collective agreement, 
other) 
 Act of 4 August 1996 on Wellbeing at Work 
 Law of 3 July 1978 on employment contracts 
 Anti-discrimination legislation 
 AMI legislation of 14 July 1994 on obligatory healthcare 
insurance 




2.2 Provisions for rehabilitation and return to work support  
The Belgian incapacity and invalidity benefit system includes several activation and vocational 
rehabilitation pathways into work. Belgian federal and regional governments have focused over 
the last years on increasing fitness for work among long-term ill workers and improving the 
incentive structure to return to work.  
The policy framework on return to work applies to several legislative areas, including legislation 
on social security, labour market regulations, wellbeing at work and disability (CNT, 2015). It is 
mainly part of the wellbeing at work legislation (Code du bien-être au travail du 4 Août 1996). The 
Act on Wellbeing at Work replaced the concept of health and safety at work with the broader 
concept of wellbeing at work, with the intent to cover all aspects of the work environment and 
promote a multidisciplinary approach to prevention. It puts the legal obligation on the employer 
to take all necessary measures to protect the wellbeing of their employees, such as risk 
assessments and medical check-ups conducted by external or internal prevention services (or 
Preventiedienst). The act has been successively reformed over the past 20 years. In addition, the 
Law of 3 July 1978 on employment contracts includes important provisions on the consequences 
of work incapacity, partial return to work and permanent work incapacity on the employment 
contract. The Law on compulsory healthcare and indemnity insurance of 14 July 1994 also 
includes provisions on invalidity and incapacity benefits, which can impact return to work. Finally, 
the Anti-discrimination Law encourages the employer to proceed to reasonable accommodations 
for a disabled worker as advised by the occupational doctor. It also forbids any employment-
related discrimination due to health or disability status. 
Returning to work gradually while keeping partial invalidity or incapacity benefits has been 
possible since 1996. The mutuality doctor must first authorise a medical part-time status or 
adjustments to the workload (Mutualités Libres, 2019a). This depends on two conditions: that the 
incapacity remains at least 50% and that the job does not jeopardise the person’s health. The 
mutuality doctor also decides about the intensity and duration of part-time work. Part-time work 
can be less or more than 50%, as long as the incapacity remains at least 50% in medical terms. If 
an improvement in the health situation is envisaged, the hours and days worked may be gradually 
increased over time until the beneficiary is ready for regular or full working time. Adjustments 
can be related to working hours (longer breaks, shorter week, fewer hours per day), work 
organisation (telework, slower workpace, change in tasks), workspace and equipment, and 
specific training, as well as support by a coach, colleague or line manager. The medical part-time 
option was rarely used in the past (OECD, 2013): in 2014, 35,989 authorisations for partial return 
to work were granted. This number rose to 54,526 in 2017 (Mutualités Libres based on NIHDI 
numbers, 2019b). Benefits are adjusted according to the number of hours worked in a week, and 
decrease if the person works more than 20% of the normal weekly working time. Before the 
reform of the calculation method in 2018, benefits used to be calculated according to the amount 
of the part-time income. Trade unions criticised this reform as it was estimated to negatively 
impact low-paid workers. To accommodate for this effect of the reform, a gradual compensation 
measure was implemented for people negatively impacted by the reform. 
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A new formal reintegration procedure (trajet de reintegration /re-integratietraject) was 
implemented in 2016 as a new chapter to the 1996 Act on Wellbeing at Work.4 Informal 
dispositions for return to work existed before this reform, such as the voluntary medical visit 
(visite de pré-reprise du travail / bezoek voorafgaand aan de werkhervatting) with the 
occupational doctor implemented in 2004, or the mandatory return to work examination for 
workers under mandatory medical surveillance (SPF Emploi, 2018). The 2016 legislation added a 
formal procedure for reintegration, requiring mutuality doctors to assess the reintegration 
possibilities within the first two months of sickness absence. Beyond systematising early 
intervention and individual case management, its aim is also to provide a series of steps to follow 
for voluntary, gradual and adapted return to work. Its goal is to increase the chances of successful 
reintegration by reintegrating workers with an employment contract within the same company, 
so that he or she can come back to a familiar environment. It outlines the sharing of 
responsibilities between the main stakeholders on a practical level, and foresees a collective 
framework for reintegration to be developed at company level, for example by health and safety 
committees (Comité pour la prévention et la protection au travail / Comité voor Preventie en 
Bescherming op het Werk). It also seeks to turn mutualities into more active gatekeepers 
regarding the control of access to incapacity and invalidity benefits. Since 2006, the professional 
integration of sick workers had been the legal responsibility of the mutuality doctors, but the 
approach remained very medically oriented with little attention to the employment aspect. 
Mutualities used to have a passive role without a strong focus on sickness management or return 
to work (OECD, 2013). The reform was thus aimed at ensuring a better use of activation measures, 
strengthening sickness monitoring and the mutualities’ management obligations. It also 
strengthened the dialogue and cooperation between the mutuality doctor and the company’s 
occupational doctor. Plus, it clarified the cases in which an employment contract could be 
terminated due to “medical force majeure”, which can now be invoked only if the employee has 
gone through a formal reintegration procedure. Figure 1 below gives an overview of options 
included in the reintegration procedure and their consequences (SPF Emploi, 2018). The 
procedure is described in more detail in Annex 2. In 2016, 4,801 formal reintegration procedures 
were initiated, and 5,015 in 2017 (Mutualités Libres based on NIHDI numbers, 2019b).  
Vocational rehabilitation (réinsertion ou réhabilitation socio-professionnelle / socioprofessionele 
re-integratie) also exists in the Belgian system for workers declared unfit to return to their former 
company, as well as for unemployed or self-employed workers (Mutualités Libres, 2019a). It 
enables the individual to attend a training or rehabilitation programme to update or acquire new 
skills, and is part of the sickness-invalidity insurance legislation. Financial incentives are attached 
to this procedure: since July 2009, the costs associated with the training (registration, materials, 
public transport, etc.) have been covered by the NIHDI. Participants continue to receive their 
benefits and are paid €1 for each hour of training plus a lump-sum payment of €500 at the end of 
the training (this amount has been recently been doubled to increase incentives). 
 
4 Royal Decree of 20 December 2016 amending the Royal Decree of 28 May 2003. 
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Figure 1. Formal reintegration procedures and their consequences 
 
Source: SPF Emploi, 2018 
 
However, participants can lose their entitlement to disability benefits within six months of the 
training, which can act as a disincentive. Plus, in 2018 the federal government introduced in its 
Job Deal (Deal pour l’Emploi) the right to an outplacement (training) of up to €1,800 paid by the 
employer, in cases where the latter invokes the medical force majeure to end the employment 
contract. 
Vocational rehabilitation (réinsertion ou réhabilitation socio-professionnelle / socioprofessionele 
re-integratie) is targeted at workers declared unfit to return to their former company, as well as 
at unemployed or self-employed workers (Mutualités Libres, 2019a). It enables the individual to 
attend a training or rehabilitation programme to update or acquire new skills. The NIHDI 
cooperates with several regional public employment services on this matter, as they are 
responsible for labour market activation policies and training. Regional agencies specialised in 
vocational rehabilitation for disabled workers (GTB, PHARE, AViQ) are also involved. Financial 
incentives are attached to this procedure: participation fees are covered by the NIHDI and 
participants receive lump-sum payment of €500 at the end of the training. However, participants 
can lose their entitlement to disability benefits within six months of the training, which can act as 
a disincentive. Plus, in 2018 the federal government introduced in its Job Deal (Deal pour l’Emploi 
/ Arbeidsdeal) the right to an outplacement (training) of up to €1,800 paid by the employer, in 
cases where the latter invokes the medical force majeure to end the employment contract.  
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Financial and technical support is available for employers at regional level if the employee’s 
permanent functional limitations are recognised (e.g. Vlaamse ondersteuningspremie in Flanders 
; SPF Emploi, 2018). Regional financial support also includes adjustments to the work 
environment, coverage of work and living expenses, paid interpreters in the case of hearing 
impairment and a mentoring premium for companies offering mentoring support to a returning 
disabled worker. Finally, in 2014 the NIHDI created a training course for “disability managers”, 
subsidised by the state and paid by the company, to support the return to work process at 
company level (NIHDI, 2019). It is based on the disability management methodology aimed at 
maintaining employment and quick and adapted return to work. Additionally, the NIHDI also runs 
pilot programmes, such as the Individual Placement and Support (IPS) programme for people 
suffering from mental health issues. It follows the “place-then-train” model and consists of 
providing early and continuous support to return to work, including after the start of the job. 
Depending on the results of the pilot programme, this model could be implemented as an 
alternative to the existing rehabilitation schemes. 
3. Involvement of social partners in shaping return to work policy at 
national level  
3.1 Industrial relations structures and return to work policy 
Belgium is characterised by a strong social dialogue tradition involving established industrial 
relations structures and actors.5 The country has a relatively high unionisation rate amounting to 
more than 50%, and collective bargaining covers approximately 90% of employees. At the 
national level, workers are mainly represented by three large trade union confederations: 
Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (ACV/CSC), General Federation of Belgian Labour 
(FGTB/ABVV) and Confederation of Liberal Trade Unions Belgium (CGSLB/ACLVB). On the 
employer side, the main national employers’ association is the Federation of Belgian Enterprises 
(FEB/VBO). In addition to this, craft and trade sector employers, self-employed and small and 
medium enterprises are represented by UNIZO in the Flemish-speaking region and UCM in the 
French-speaking region. The membership rate of employers’ organisations in Belgium is above 
80% (ETUI, 2016).  
National social dialogue takes places within thematic advisory bodies: the National Labour Council 
(Conseil National du Travail / Nationale Arbeidsraad), the Central Council of the Economy (Conseil 
Central de l’Economie / Centrale Raad voor het Bedrijfsleven), and the High Council for Prevention 
and Protection at Work (Conseil Supérieur pour la Prévention et la Protection au Travail / Hoge 
Raad voor Preventie en Bescherming op het Werk), which is an advisory body focused on matters 
related to wellbeing at work legislation (ETUI, 2016). The National Labour Council (NLC) has a 
cross-sectoral remit extending to the whole of Belgium, covering all companies and sectors. Its 
 
5 For a brief overview of the industrial relations system in Belgium, see www.worker-participation.eu/National-
Industrial-Relations/Countries/Belgium/Trade-Unions provided by the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) 
(last update in 2016).  
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composition is divided equally between representatives of the main employers’ associations and 
trade unions. Its principal functions are to provide advice and deliver opinions to a minister or the 
two chambers of the legislature (upon request or on its own initiative) on general issues of a social 
nature. It also provides a platform for collective bargaining agreements and performs an 
important role of policy evaluation. 
Since the beginning of the 2010s, the NLC has been working on the topic of return to work. It 
holds the coordination role of the “Platform for consultation between actors involved in the 
process of voluntary return to work of people with health problems” (CNT, 2015). This platform 
on return to work was set up as a structural consultation framework bringing together the social 
partners (NLC) and the other institutions (NIHDI, Ministry of Labour, Federal Agency for 
Occupational Risks - Fedris) involved in the process of voluntary return to work. Its goal was to 
develop an integrated approach to return to work after an illness, taking into account social 
security aspects as well as employment and health and safety issues, gathering all institutions 
involved in the issue. As regards the government, the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Social 
Affairs have been involved in the issue of return to work and prepared jointly the Royal Decree of 
2016 on the new reintegration procedure. Government representatives stressed the key 
importance of discussion and negotiation with social partners in preparing the legislation at 
federal level. 
As mentioned in the introduction, part of the data collection of REWIR involves national social 
partners across the EU gathering information on their involvement in return to work policies in 
their respective countries. The main characteristics of the respondents to the REWIR social 
partner survey in Belgium are summarised in Annex 1, Table 4. In the following text, some key 
findings from this survey are reported alongside the information gathered during stakeholder 
discussion groups and semi-structured interviews.6  
The information gathered from these various sources provides a variety of views and involvement 
of different industrial relation actors on return to work policy in Belgium. The majority of the 
social partner survey respondents also stated that they were aware of national policies and 
measures that facilitate return to work after sickness absence. It was also highlighted that the 
main regulatory framework in return to work in Belgium does not specifically focus on workers 
experiencing a chronic disease, but more generally on those workers who have been long-term 
absent from work for medical reasons generally, which might be due to a chronic disease, but can 
also include other factors.  
One result that emerged from various discussion groups with stakeholders was that the focus of 
social partners was mainly on prevention when it came to health-related issues in the workplace. 
Since the start of the consultation platform organised by the NLC, the topic of return to work has 
been rather high on the trade unions’ agendas. This was accentuated when social partners 
 
6 We acknowledge the limitation of drawing general conclusions about the perspectives of social partners in 
Belgium based on the online social partner survey due to its relatively small sample size. To compensate for this, 
additional information has been gathered through literature review, a roundtable event and stakeholder 
discussion groups involving key stakeholders on return to work in Belgium.  
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noticed the adverse social consequences of the 2016 reform, notably the sharp increase in 
contract terminations due to medical force majeure (CNT, 2018c). However, it is still taking time 
for social partners to fully incorporate this topic into their programmes. According to results from 
the social partner survey for Belgium, nearly two thirds of social partners had only marginal and 
ad hoc involvement in return to work policy making or policy implementation, but would like to 
have more active involvement. The results from the survey additionally suggest that the initiative 
to come up with a return to work policy was taken by other bodies (rather than social partners 
themselves) such as the government.  
Against this short background, and as previously mentioned in section 2 of this report, it is 
important to note that other actors at national level play a key role in shaping return to work 
policy, such as the National Institute for Health and Disability Insurance (NIHDI), the National 
Employment Office (RVA/ONEM), mutual insurance providers, regional employment agencies, 
and occupational physicians and academics, who are currently finishing an evaluation of the 
return to work legislation.7 Patient organisations are also important stakeholders in return to 
work, as they advocate for patient rights and inform patients about the various options and legal 
tools at the workplace after their disease. These organisations try to engage with social partners 
and the government to raise awareness, as well as talking to employers to inform them about the 
possibilities for reasonable adjustment at the workplace. They are also occasionally consulted by 
the government.  
Company-level industrial relations structures also matter substantially in facilitating the 
implementation of national legislation at the more disaggregate level via their members, as 
discussed in detail in section 4 of this report. They serve as the intermediaries between high-level 
decision-making bodies and the regions and companies where the policies are implemented. A 
key role for national social partners is therefore to inform and support their local members in 
understanding how the new procedure works, for example via study days and training courses or 
booklets (CSC, 2019; FGTB, 2019). Equally, they are responsible for collecting the issues observed 
at the local level and raising them for discussion and negotiation at national level. This important 
bottom-up function follows the pyramidal structure of trade unions: local branches are in contact 
with company-level union members and run regional offices of social rights (Office régionale de 
droits sociaux) to provide legal and strategic support to workers facing problems with their 
employers. Information and complaints can be then channelled to the sectoral level and at cross-
industry level. Regional stakeholders share information with national stakeholders, which enables 
them to negotiate on legitimate grounds.  
 
 





3.2 Interactions between industrial relations actors and other stakeholders in return 
to work policy  
The nature of interactions between key industrial relations actors is generally reported as 
cooperative, and discussions tend to be constructive on return to work policy. All of the opinions 
issued by the NLC have been unanimous, which shows the social partners’ willingness to display 
a “united front” and give strength to their recommendations to influence the government. They 
especially agree on the need to ensure that reintegration is a voluntary process and happens 
early, to change mindsets on reintegration and to give a key role to the occupational physician in 
the reintegration process. However, there have been several instances of disagreement between 
social partners. One example involved the financial responsibility that the employer should carry, 
as trade unions asked for the latter to cover the salary for the two first months of sick leave. 
Employers opposed this proposition as this measure would place small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in a difficult situation.  
There has also been some disagreement between social partners and the government. 
Dissensions intensified after the disclosure of figures on the increase in contract terminations due 
to medical force majeure. Trade unions condemned these adverse social consequences in the 
media and the issue became increasingly debated in the public sphere. Social partners also regret 
that none of their recommendations have been implemented, which is partly related to the 
political stalemate that Belgium encountered until the formation of the De Croo government in 
September 2020. Before then, the government was mainly in charge of current affairs 
(Gouvermenent d’affaires courantes / Regering in lopende zaken) with limited competences in 
diverse policy areas. Another bone of contention was the government’s draft legislative proposal 
in May 2018, which planned to add financial sanctions in case employers and employees failed to 
fulfil their responsibilities regarding the new reintegration procedure. The proposal was strongly 
rejected by the NLC (CNT, 2018b). The NLC also criticised the introduction of a new general 
compensation measure for employees declared unfit to get back to their former job as part of the 
Job Deal in 2018. This measure was seen as not individualised enough and lacking tailored support 
from regional employment services (CNT, 2018d). 
Interactions on return to work in Belgium can become complex due to Belgium’s multilevel 
governance. Return to work policy cuts across policy areas assigned either to the federal level 
(social security) or the regional level (active labour market policy), which can make the design of 
comprehensive policy common framework challenging. One of the key results emerging from 
data collection was to the need to increase cooperation among various stakeholders to facilitate 
the implementation of the legislation on return to work after an illness.   
3.3 Outcomes of social dialogue regarding return to work policy  
One of the main outcomes of social dialogue on return to work at national level was the key role 
played by the NLC in supporting the overhaul of the legislation on the matter via the Platform on 
return to work. The overhaul of the policy framework originated around 2010, when the NIHDI 
put the issue of return to work on the agenda following the sharp increase in long-term sickness 
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insurance beneficiaries. It called for a more active approach towards workers on sick leave who 
are able to perform some professional activity, as it would be beneficial for their recovery 
prospects and for the sustainability of the Belgian social security system. In 2015 the NLC 
published a report on the results of this consultation, laying some basic principles for the 
legislation: the need for collective reintegration, concrete incentives, voluntary procedure, 
clarification on the use of medical force majeure, and the key role of the occupational doctor. 
These discussions and agreements were later adopted as part of the Royal Decree in 2016.8 By 
consulting experts and civil society stakeholders during its evaluation of the legislation, the NLC 
also gathered relevant information on return to work policy and potential gaps that needed to be 
addressed. However, it is unclear whether and how the legislation will be modified following the 
2018 evaluation from the NLC and the evaluation performed by a group of academics9.  
Some stakeholders interviewed for this project highlighted that beyond influencing legislation, 
Belgian social partners could do more on the topic of return to work, such as issuing common 
practical guidelines for health and safety committees, employers and union delegates on how to 
implement a company-level reintegration policy. Social partners could also work at cross-sectoral 
or sectoral levels on collective bargaining agreements specifically on return to work, which has 
not been the case so far. Outcomes of social dialogue at sectoral level are more difficult to 
determine. Sectors follow diverging approaches on return to work as they face different prospects 
in finding adjustments in terms of tasks for workers suffering from chronic conditions. In this 
respect, the availability of diverse tasks within a sector seems to be a facilitator for return to work. 
For instance, firms in the construction sector tend to have well-established procedures for return 
to work and potential for adjustment in task allocation. In this sector, progressive reintegration 
into the workplace is possible, for example by allocating fewer physically demanding tasks to the 
worker returning to work after a sickness absence. Other sectors face difficulties in proceeding to 
reasonable accommodations, such as the Belgian service voucher sector (including cleaning and 
homecare services) which is characterised by a high incidence of musculoskeletal diseases. Trade 
union representatives in this sector have tried to react to the negative consequences of the 
reintegration procedure by putting the issue on the sectoral negotiation agenda.  
3.4 Views of industrial relations actors on the policy framework on return to work  
As mentioned previously, it was confirmed by a number of stakeholders that return to work after 
a chronic disease is a salient issue in Belgium. Most stakeholders interviewed welcomed the 
creation of a clear formal reintegration procedure and tended to agree that action was needed in 
the face of high prevalence of chronic diseases, long-term sickness absence and rising 
expenditures linked to sickness and disability benefits. However, there is a consensus that a more 
 
8 For more details on the Royal Decree, see the legal documentation (in French):  
www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn=2016102808&table_name=loi  





thorough ex-ante impact assessment should have been conducted and that the procedure should 
be revised. 
Trade unions and employers share the view that informal procedures are a more efficient and 
flexible approach to reintegration, where the occupational doctor can give advice instead of 
making binding decisions. Informal procedures allow for a case-by-case approach, taking into 
account sectoral and company-level considerations, as well as those specific to the worker’s 
health and preferences. Formal procedures tend to be depicted as instruments of last resort if all 
other informal options have been explored, or if there is a conflict between the employee and 
the employer. Indeed, employers criticise the reintegration procedure for being too cumbersome 
in terms of administration, as well as too formalistic and slow. Social partners also underline the 
primary importance of prevention, which should be prioritised in company-level social dialogue 
to prevent mental and musculoskeletal illnesses. 
Another common criticism relates to the fact that formal reintegration procedures lead too often 
to a contract termination due to medical reasons, which can result from the occupational 
physician’s decision C or D as designed in the legislation. This criticism is particularly shared by 
trade union representatives, who describe the legislation as having been drafted too hastily and 
without reflection on the potential unforeseen impacts of the procedure on contract termination. 
Group discussions conducted in the realm of this project showed that trade unions are now 
advising their members against engaging in the formal procedure, as the risk of dismissal is very 
high. This aspect was also mentioned in a unanimous opinion issued by the NLC (2018b), which 
underlined the regrettable human and social consequences of the use of medical force majeure 
to end a contract following the decision of the occupational physician. In general, social partners 
underline that the procedure suffers from a bad reputation among labour market stakeholders, 
and that the latter need to focus more on making the most of the remaining capabilities of 
returning employees when implementing the procedure. The data available in 2018 (CNT, 2018c) 
showed that the large majority of decisions taken by occupational doctors were decisions D (68%), 
i.e. the worker is definitively unfit to work in the same company. There is no systematic support 
provided to this type of worker, and little is known on their situation after the dismissal. Support 
measures and procedures exist for them, such as initiatives by the NIHDI and regional 
employment services, but social partners underline the need for a coordinated and systematic 
approach to raise public awareness on this aspect.  
The lack of public and reliable data on return to work after an illness is also criticised by social 
partners, as it renders the evaluation of the new policy more difficult (CNT, 2018c). No federal 
institution is responsible for gathering the results of the reintegration procedure. More 
importantly, there is no data on the situation of former employees who have been dismissed for 
medical reasons following a decision D. The lack of consistent data also hampers the analysis of 
the situation of employees who were reintegrated into their company, for example regarding 
adaptations in terms of workload, working time and tasks. 
Various stakeholders emphasise that the public debate tends to be too focused on the idea of 
sanctions and assigning responsibilities, and not enough on incentivising employers and 
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employees to actively engage in reintegration. Stakeholders also regret the absence of support 
mechanisms to accompany the stakeholders or guide them along the return to work process, 
including inside the firm. This is one of the common points raised by representatives of both the 
trade unions and employers’ organisations. The cost of reintegration procedures can be a burden 
on firms and employers, especially SMEs, which are often not aware of the financial support 
available to them or of the specificities of the regulation. As a result, budgets dedicated to 
reintegration often draw on the budget allocated to prevention. Plus, SMEs often do not have the 
human resources to implement a reintegration procedure and reorganise the team if the 
returning employee is on medical part time. Another issue highlighted by trade unions is that 
employers are not strongly incentivised to invest in prevention or create opportunities for 
adapted work in the company, given the short duration of the guaranteed salary period. One 
avenue suggested by social partners is to revise the legislation with provisions specific to SMEs 
and to provide them with further support to implement reasonable accommodations.  
Social partners in the NLC agree on several recommendations for modification (CNT, 2018c). They 
argue for more consultation with stakeholders before the occupational physician takes a decision 
C or D (i.e. permanent unfitness) and for support from a trade union delegate or representative 
of the company’s health and safety committee during the procedure. Social partners also ask to 
change the timing of the procedure, as it currently leaves either too much or too little time for 
dialogue and consultation. The occupational physician should also underline more the remaining 
capabilities of the employee in the work ability assessment. The period allocated to appeal against 
the decision of the physician is considered too short, and the time that the employer has to 
prepare the reintegration is seen as too long (it now amounts to 12 months). Social partners and 
patient organisations also stress the lack of centralised access to information for employers and 
employees, arguing that a central website with all the information on how to get back to work 
and the type of allowances available would be helpful.  
The need to enhance cooperation between doctors was strongly pointed out. Multiple doctors 
are involved in treating the medical file of a worker, including the occupational physician, the 
medical officer of the mutual insurance provider and the general practitioner (GP) following the 
worker privately. In most cases, decisions on the fitness of the worker to go back to work are not 
coordinated among these doctors due to confidentiality reasons and data sharing constraints. The 
GPs are not involved in the procedure and tend not to refer patients to occupational health 
physicians if they think that their job or workplace has contributed to their health disorder or 
sickness absence. Plus, despite their crucial role, occupational doctors are depicted as 
overburdened and disapproving of the very limited and binding range of options they have to 
choose from. Therefore, social partners asked for the creation of a digital tool that could help 
data sharing and coordinated follow-up between the different health professionals and 
institutions involved in the reintegration process. In parallel, pilot projects, such as the TRIO 
project, have been implemented by professional medical associations to address this lack of 
multidisciplinary collaboration between the three professions, by organising common training 
events and dialogue (Lenoir, 2017). 
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Finally, the industrial relations stakeholders interviewed stressed the need for a cultural change 
to avoid the stigma around return to work. There is a growing consensus that working after a 
disease can be good for the health of the worker and can prevent social exclusion. This requires 
a shift in mindset regarding the remaining abilities of a chronically ill employee, and how to build 
on those abilities. However, the lack of willingness or possibility to adapt a job/occupation, and 
the feeling of being demoted can hamper a smooth return to work. Therefore, social partners – 
via the NLC – underlined that the “Disability Case Manager” training organised by the NIHDI 
should be more widely promoted among firms (CNT, 2018c). This would help raise awareness 
among HR services and staff about good practices regarding absenteeism and return to work. 
4. The return to work process at company level and the involvement 
of social partners 
4.1 Workers’ experiences of the return to work process at company level 
Having described the policy context on the topic of return to work after chronic illness in Belgium, 
as well as the involvement of social partners in shaping policy at national level, we now 
complement this information with an analysis of return to work processes in Belgium at company 
level. As detailed previously, part of the data collection for the REWIR project consisted of 
national company and worker surveys, in order to gather qualitative information on return to 
work at company level in Belgium and the involvement of industrial relations actors. In the 
following section, information from the two surveys is gathered and analysed.10 In addition, the 
data is complemented by information from the national interviews and stakeholder discussion 
groups where relevant. Summary tables on the sample composition of the two surveys can be 
found in the Annex, Tables 2 and 3.  
We first turn to the perspective of workers on returning to work after a chronic disease. The 
majority of workers in the sample had already returned to work at the time of data collection, 
though a minority were due to undergo their treatment after a recent diagnosis.11 Of the workers 
that had already returned to work, 59% stated that this was upon their own initiative. The vast 
majority of workers also stated that they had concerns about returning to work. These included 
potential lack of employer support if productivity or concentration did not fully meet manager 
expectations, unwillingness of the employer to adjust the working conditions post-illness, and an 
expectation to work long hours and continue as they had done previously immediately upon 
returning to work.  
Two thirds of the workers surveyed stated that, at least initially, they returned to the same job. 
As Figure 2 demonstrates, the majority of workers received little adjustment upon returning to 
 
10 As with the social partner survey, it is important to highlight that the results of the worker and company 
survey cannot be regarded as representative, given the small sample size and non-random sampling techniques. 
Rather, the aim is to supplement the previous results with additional qualitative information.  
11 Questions addressed only to workers yet to undergo treatment are not addressed here due to a very small 
sample size of 10 responses.  
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their jobs. Most common were adjustments in daily working time and flexible time to facilitate 
medical issues, but only about a third of workers received reasonable or extensive support in this. 
Adjustments in tasks, the work environment or the formal work contract were also rare, and the 
sharing of tasks with colleagues or the postponement of deadlines even more so.  
Figure 2. Adjustments offered to workers when returning to work after a long-term illness 
 
Source: REWIR worker survey, own calculations. Number of respondents: 26. 
 
The results from interviews and stakeholder discussions present a mixed picture as regards the 
role of trade unions in facilitating return to work at company level. While trade union 
representatives emphasised the central role of local trade union representatives, respondents 
from other organisations, including employer organisations, stated that the role of trade unions 
at company level was rather weak, and that return to work was more of an individual rather than 
collective issue. Indeed, the survey results indicate that trade union delegates play a limited role 
in facilitating return to work at company level. More than half of the survey respondents were 
trade union members, and almost two thirds stated that they had access to a trade union or other 
employee representative at their workplace. Nevertheless, workers were generally not satisfied 
with the support offered by trade unions in their return to work process. Only one in five 
respondents received the expected advice or better from their trade union.  
Accordingly, as Figure 3 shows, trade union representatives were generally not regarded as 
important in the return to work process. The vast majority of respondents evaluated the role of 
trade union representatives as not important or very limited. One explanation for the limited role 
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sensitive to be handled through social dialogue, and local delegates often do not have access to 
information on employees struggling with return to work issues unless directly approached, given 
both confidentiality and the fact that the employer has no obligation to communicate with union 
delegates. The actors that were generally regarded by workers as being the most significant were 
their boss and work colleagues, as well as, to some extent, their GP and family.  
Figure 3. Workers’ evaluation of the role of different actors in facilitating return to work after 
sick leave 
 
Source: REWIR worker survey, own calculations. Number of respondents: 25. 
The survey respondents were also asked to share additional information on their return to work 
process. Their comments reflect the results presented above. Although some employees had 
positive experiences, the majority expressed that they felt left alone in the return to work process, 
with a lack of support from their employer, but also from the trade union. Some also expressed 
frustration with the regulation that governs the return to work process. Ultimately, several 
employees reported leaving or changing their job after their return to work.  
4.2 Perspectives of company actors on the return to work process at company level 
Looking at the perspective of companies on the return to work process, in most cases companies 
did indicate that an employee absence has an effect on their organisation (Figure 4). In particular, 
the worker is not replaced in the first instance, but workflow has to be rearranged and job tasks 
divided between other employees. As underlined during interviews, such adjustments are 
especially difficult for SMEs, which lack capacity to redirect workflow. During the return to work 
process, companies consider certain resources as helpful, specifically legal advice during sick 
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was stated that such external counselling, information on workplace adjustments and guidance 
on financial strategies in dealing with sick leave absences are lacking.  
Figure 4. Perceived effect of an employee absence on the organisation 
 
Note: Multiple answers possible. 
Source: REWIR manager survey, own calculations. Number of respondents: 20. 
 
Respondents to interviews and participants in group discussions strongly emphasised that Belgian 
work culture and continuing stigma around workers with chronic disease influenced their ability 
to return to work successfully, and that many employers were unwilling to adjust tasks for 
employees returning to work. However, this is not reflected in the results from the company 
survey. In general, survey respondents did not perceive workers to be less committed after being 
diagnosed with a chronic disease. Nevertheless, a colleague returning to work on reduced duties 
will increase the workload of colleagues. The majority of respondents disagreed that workers 
should have a phased return to work on full pay (60%) or that they should have more time off 
than the legislation currently stipulates (45%). However, it was also stated that workers should 
be entitled to adjusted working duties at the organisation’s discretion (70%) or even as a legal 
entitlement (55%). Finally, the vast majority of respondents agreed that staying in touch with an 
employee during their absence was important, and most also thought that returning to work 
during treatment should be encouraged if possible.  
Turning to the perception of trade unions, in 90% of organisations there was some form of 
employee representation. While return to work was addressed in company level collective 
agreements only in a minority of companies (20%), 60% of respondents confirmed that they 
consulted on their organisation’s return to work issues with trade unions or employee 
representatives. In the majority of cases, these interactions were of a regular nature, and a trade 
union representative was part of a health and safety committee that discussed return to work. 
While 60% of companies see no challenges in interacting with trade unions, there was little 
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with other employee representatives. Beneficial outcomes from interaction with trade unions 
that were highlighted included agreements on specific return to work provisions in binding 
collective agreements, informal agreements and training sessions for managers or team leaders 
on dealing with employees returning to work.  
4.3 Interactions between employer and employee in facilitating return to work 
From a worker’s perspective, it seems that the experience of the return to work process is quite 
individualised and not much is coordinated at company level. Most employees declared that 
adjustments in their tasks or responsibilities were not negotiated between their trade union or 
employee representatives and their employer. Therefore, negotiations did not seem to play an 
important role in the return to work process. Employees still under treatment were finding 
support from either their boss, their team leader or line manager, or a patient organisation.  
Regarding interaction with between employers and employees, the return to work process did 
not seem very coordinated. Employees were rather critical of the coordination between health 
professionals and employers, as well of the preparedness of their company regarding reasonable 
accommodations upon their return. Half of the employees surveyed felt welcomed at their 
workplace, and only a few respondents declared having received guidance and mentoring from 
their employer or their trade union during their return to work. As found in the interviews and 
stakeholder group discussions, while procedures exist at company level they are often not well 
implemented and can be difficult to understand for the worker. In addition, the creation of a 
welcoming social environment in the company, while crucial, can be challenging, particularly as 
colleagues might be sceptical of reintegration given that it will increase the burden on them.  
Figure 5. Workers’ experience with the return to work process 
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On the other side, most managers declared that they had regular interactions with workers on 
sick leave (70%) and in an informal setting, i.e. via phone calls, friendly conversations or indirect 
information via colleagues (77%). Similarly, the qualitative data strongly emphasises the 
importance of informally keeping in touch in facilitating return to work, though employers had to 
be careful not to give the impression of “harassing” their employee. Reflecting this, the majority 
declared that they did not involve their workers in work-related issues, and only half of 
respondents kept the worker informed about issues such as work decisions and planning. Most 
returns to work were initiated by the employees themselves: only 14% of respondents declared 
that they initiated the return. 
Regarding measures to support and foster return to work, the most implemented measures 
included cooperation with external organisations on occupational health and safety, the 
possibility for a phased return to work, and ad hoc and flexible adjustment plans for each 
employee. Informal coordination between the employee and employer was the preferred way of 
dealing with reintegration. This entailed thorough discussion and planning of the reintegration 
before the employee returned to work to develop a joint strategy. Adjustments in working time, 
workload and tasks were also widespread among the companies that took part in the survey. In 
general, respondents were understanding and declared not to expect the workers to come back 
to their pre-illness productivity level. Again, these results are somewhat at odds with those from 
the interviews and stakeholder discussions, where it was reported that many companies 
struggled to offer substantial adjustments to employees and often expected full productivity 
upon return, especially since they lacked incentives to offer adjustments given the current 
legislation. Integration becomes more difficult the longer the worker is away. Of course, there 
may be selection bias in the company survey sample, in that companies that are more interested 
in the topic of return to work and are more committed to facilitating it for their employees are 
more likely to participate in research on the topic. This may explain why companies in the sample 
appear generally more supportive of return to work and more willing to offer adjustments.  
Praised outcomes from interactions with union representatives on the matter included training 
sessions for managers on interacting with chronically ill employees, and informal agreements on 
the role of employee representatives in supporting management of return to work. Specific return 
to work provisions in collective agreements are also seen as beneficial outcomes of the 
interaction with union representatives. 
Less implemented measures included common standard procedures and a defined adjustment 
plan for each employee – even though it is now mandatory to have a company-level policy on 
employee reintegration for medium and large companies, to be discussed in the health and safety 
committee. The fact that medical reintegration is only rarely discussed in the health and safety 
committees in practice was also raised in interviews. Trainings for co-workers on how to interact 
with the employee returning from a long-term illness happen very rarely. 
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Figure 6. Support offered by the company to the employee returning to work (number that 
agree/strongly agree) 
 
Source: REWIR manager survey, own calculations. Number of respondents: 19.  
4.4 Views on future potential for social dialogue to support return to work policies at 
company level 
As regards the future role of social dialogue to support return to work policy at company level, 
employees favour a stronger role for trade unions (Figure 7). They agree that trade unions should 
continue to be involved in health-related issues, and that return to work should be part of the 
social dialogue negotiation agenda. Regarding the favoured form of support that should be 
provided by unions, employees seem to prefer the negotiation of binding agreements with the 
employer on reasonable accommodations during reintegration, while they tend to be more 
indifferent about individual consultations with trade unions. Respondents are rather split on the 
capacity for unions to be able to facilitate return to work in Belgium.  
Figure 7. Workers’ opinions on the role of unions and their dialogue with employers for 
facilitating return to work 
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Results from the social partner survey indicate that trade union representatives strive 
unanimously for more active involvement in the implementation of return to work policy in 
Belgium. On the other hand, representatives of employers’ associations are more split on their 
preferred involvement in return to work policy: a quarter of them are satisfied with their current 
involvement and another quarter wish for more involvement. Similarly, in the interviews and 
stakeholder discussions, employer organisations tended to see return to work as an individual 
rather than collective matter, where unions only play a limited role, while trade unions 
emphasised the potential for social dialogue at company level to influence return to work 
processes.  
According to managers’ opinion, a few elements should change regarding return to work in their 
companies, such as better interpersonal relations with employees to deal directly with employee 
reintegration, or better cooperation with health professionals and patient organisations to 
facilitate the return process. They also tend to agree that organisational policies should be 
improved. One avenue for improved organisational policies that was raised in the interviews was 
the development of a return to work strategy in the health and safety committee, mandated by 
national legislation. Social partners can be involved in this process of discussion within the 
committee. 
On the other hand, they do not see more legislative and institutional support as a promising 
perspective. Respondents had a sceptical outlook on the current legislation: no respondent 
declared that it provided good guidelines for company-level actions, which resonates with some 
interviews performed during the REWIR project in Belgium. They agree that legislation serves as 
a general framework and suffers from being too broad or unclear and confusing. However, they 
do not wish for more specific legislative provisions on company-level return to work policy, with 
most respondents welcoming flexibility. 
5. Discussion of research findings and conclusion 
This report has analysed the role of social partners in the design and implementation of policies 
on return to work after a long-term illness in Belgium. This topic became an important issue on 
the political agenda in Belgium in the 2010s, as the increasing number of incidences of sick leave 
due to chronic disease came hand in hand with soaring social security expenditures. Faced with 
increasing concern over incapacity for work, absenteeism (mainly due to mental health and 
musculoskeletal illnesses) and the financial sustainability of the Belgian welfare state, 
governments have sought to address the economic impact of sickness absence by means of 
activation policies, i.e. by offering more opportunities to formerly sick employees. This resonates 
with the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy, as it gradually increases formerly ill employees’ 
presence at work and fitness for work, and enables longer labour market involvement.  
Our analysis of the role of social partners in facilitating reintegration into the workplace relied on 
various sources and data collection methods, including interviews with key informants and three 
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surveys targeted at social partners, workers and employers, as well as two focus groups and a 
roundtable discussion, complemented by a literature and policy review. What shows from our 
analysis is the significant and multi-faceted role that social partners assume in the development 
and implementation of return to work policies in Belgium. To a higher extent than in other 
countries studied in the realm of the REWIR project, social dialogue has helped in developing a 
new framework on return to work, despite important limitations. 
After the National Institute for Health and Disability Insurance put the need to improve the 
reintegration of employees suffering from a long-term disease on the agenda, social partners – 
via the National Labour Council – participated in the design of a new reintegration procedure 
targeted at employees seeking to return to their former professional activity. They influenced the 
legislation by putting forward some key principles, such as the concept of a voluntary 
reintegration process, the key role of the occupational physician, the need for collective 
reintegration and concrete incentives. However, the unforeseen consequences of the 2016 
reform have been criticised, especially by trade unions, mostly regarding the issue of contract 
termination due to medical reasons.  
Regarding the evolution of the policy framework on return to work as a result of the reform, one 
of our key findings is that since EU-OSHA established its typology of systems of return to work 
(2016), the Belgian policy framework has evolved towards early intervention and a case 
management approach. This is exemplified by the new obligation for the health insurance 
provider to assess reintegration options based on the employee’s medical condition at the start 
of the invalidity period. The scope of the system remains fragmented, with separate schemes for 
employees with occupational or “private” illnesses, but the reintegration scheme now entitles all 
employees on sick leave (due to a non-occupational disease) to start a reintegration procedure 
and get support from the occupational doctor. 
The financial incentives for employers to engage in early planning of return to work have not been 
substantially changed. This contrasts with the Dutch example, where the guaranteed salary 
period has been extended to two years, compared to one month in Belgium (Pacolet, 2019). On 
the other hand, the employer now has clearer responsibilities regarding the creation of an 
individualised reintegration plan for the employee, and of a company policy on return to work, as 
well as the duty to fund training in the case of termination of the contract for medical reasons. 
The employee has several incentives to return to work thanks to transitional work options. The 
occupational physician still holds a key intermediary role between the employer and the 
employee (EU-OSHA, 2016), as the new reintegration procedure is structured around the work 
ability assessment. However, occupational physicians tend to have little time for personalised 
case management and there are still coordination problems between health professionals 
involved in return to work.  
It emerged from data collection that effective social dialogue can help reintegration, but that 
sectoral and firm characteristics play a more important role in determining the success of 
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reintegration. Also, return to work after a long-term illness can be difficult to tackle via social 
dialogue, given its sensitive and private nature. It involves workers at the margin of traditional 
social dialogue, as they are excluded from professional life during the period of their illness. 
However, employers can play a key role at firm level in ensuring smooth reintegration, for 
example by involving colleagues and line managers in the process, beyond HR and occupational 
health services. Some instruments and legal dispositions are in place, such as the obligation to 
discuss a company procedure on return to work every year within health and safety committees. 
However, these dispositions are not well implemented on the ground. Similarly, trade union 
delegates or employee representatives are given an important role in the new legislation 
developments (CSC, 2019). They can perform important functions: offering emotional support 
during the reintegration process, providing legal advice to the employee in case of conflict with 
the employer, guiding him or her strategically through the complexity of the procedure and during 
the negotiations with the employer, and being a mediator with the HR services and employer, as 
well as with colleagues. Delegates can also put reintegration on the agenda of health and safety 
committees, which can assess the company reintegration policy based on the quantitative and 
qualitative evaluation provided by the occupational physician. However, there is substantial room 
for improvement in this area, especially due to a lack of information on the sides of union 
delegates and employees, as well as to the private and sensitive nature of reintegration after a 
long-term illness.  
Our findings highlight that a tailored company-level approach tends to be more efficient when 
combined with a broad national framework enforcing basic rights and requirements regarding 
return to work procedures. Informal procedures are often praised as a more efficient and flexible 
approach to reintegration, in which the occupational doctor can give advice instead of making 
binding decisions. In parallel, social partners at federal level should coordinate via the NLC to issue 
practical guidelines based on best practices to help companies and local union delegates to design 
company-level return to work procedures. They could also start cross-sectoral or sectoral 
negotiations on collective agreements on return to work. Social partners had already applied such 
a proactive approach on other topics related to wellbeing, for example to tackle burnout (CNT, 
2018a). 
Finally, the reintegration procedure instituted by the 2016 reform has some substantial “starting 
flaws”, which should be addressed by the next federal government, as highlighted in section 3 of 
this report. Ultimately, gathering reliable and systematic data on the outcomes of reintegration 
procedures and the situation of former employees who have been dismissed for medical reasons 
should be prioritised. It would allow the impact of reintegration on the career of employees to be 
measured, whether they return to the same company or not. It would also enable a better 
understanding of the gendered implications of return to work, as female-dominated sectors tend 
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Annex 1: Summary of the data collection 
Table 1: Overview of sample and respondent identification – Belgium 
Survey and target 
group 
Total number of 
responses 
Number of relevant 
responses 
Workers’ survey 115 48 
Social partners’ survey 10 8 
Managers’ survey 37 22 
Notes: Total number of responses refers to overall data intake for Belgium, within the period of data collection. 
Number of relevant responses refers to the number of completed surveys for the social partners and the company 
survey. For the workers’ survey, the number of relevant cases refers to responses where the respondent selected 
“Yes” in Question 6 – Have you experienced a chronic disease in your working life? 
 
Table 2: Overview of sample and respondent identification – REWIR workers’ survey for Belgium 




Mean age in years  48 
Mean length of working life in years  26 
Level of education  
Low qualified (up to lower secondary) 2 
Middle qualified (up to post-secondary 
vocational) 
14 
Highly qualified (up to university education) 26 
Other 5 
Type of organisation where the respondent worked prior to diagnosis/treatment  
Domestic  32 
Foreign owned  11 
Don’t know 4 
Private sector 34 
Public sector 11 
Trade union membership  
Yes 25 
No 20 
Trade union presence at the workplace  
Yes 26 
No 21 







Intensive physical activity 6 
Intensive emotional stress 22 
Company size   
Below 20 11 
20 - 50 5 
50 - 500 12 
500 – 1,000 1 
Above 1,000 18 
Currently on sick leave  
Yes 5 
No 5 
Three most frequently reported diseases  
1. Other (21) 
2. Mental disease (8) 
3. Cancer (8) 
 
Table 3: Company survey data structure for Belgium collected within the REWIR project 
Structure of responses Responses 
Ownership type  
Domestic 19 
Foreign 14 




Above 250  17 
Predominant type of workers   
1. Administrative workers / office clerical (19) 
2. Highly skilled specialists (5) 
3. Low-skilled manual workers (3) 
Three most commonly reported economic sectors represented  
1. Financial services (21) 
2. Other (4) 






Presence of trade union or other form of workers’ representation  
Yes  17 
No 1 
 
Table 4: Social partners survey data structure for Belgium collected within the REWIR project 
Structure of responses Responses 
Type of organisation  
Employers’ associations 4 
Trade unions 4 
Other 0 
Level of social dialogue engagement  
National  5 
Sub-national (territorial) 2 
Sectoral 3 
Three most commonly reported sectors represented 
1. Financial intermediation (2) 
2. Agriculture and manufacturing (1) 
Notes: The social partner survey was run from October 2019 until August 2020. For more details on the 
questionnaires, see the analytical framework report by Akgüç et al. (2020).  
 
Table 5: Summary of types of stakeholders involved in national interviews 
Stakeholder Number  
Academic expert 1 
Government representative 1 
Patient organisation representative 1 
Civil servant 1 
Disability insurance representative 1 
Sectoral employers’ organisation representative 1 
 
Table 6: Summary of participants in focus group 
Stakeholder Number  
EU sectoral employer organisation 1 
National employer organisation representative 2 
Disability insurance representative 1 
Civil servant 2 
 
Table 7: Summary of participants in stakeholder group discussions 
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Stakeholder Number  
Trade union group discussion  
National trade union representative 4 
Employer group discussion  
National employer organisation representative 2 
Sectoral employer organisation representative 1 
HR consultant 1 
Company HR manager 1 
 
 
Annex 2: Description of the formal reintegration procedure  
The reintegration procedure is divided into several predefined steps (SPF Emploi, 2018). The first 
one is the start of the procedure, which can be triggered by the occupational physician only. 
Three stakeholders can ask the occupational physician to start a formal procedure: the employee 
(any time during the sick leave), the employer (four months after the start of the incapacity) and 
the employee’s mutuality doctor. During the medical examination (quick scan) in the first two 
months of incapacity, the mutuality doctor classifies the worker into one of the four categories, 
which can lead to a start of a procedure: return to work after six months (if the worker does not 
return, the officer can ask to start a procedure), no reintegration possible, re-examination every 
two months (the officer can ask to start a procedure when he/she assesses that the person is 
ready to return to work), possible return to work to an adapted job (travail adapté) or to a 
different job. The occupational doctor needs to notify the other parties when one party asks for 
the procedure to be started. 
The second step is the medical examination of the employee by the occupational doctor. This 
focuses on two aspects: whether the employee can perform his or her previous job (travail 
convenu) with some possible adjustments, and what the reintegration possibilities are based on 
the employee’s capability. These assessments do not consider the practical possibilities inside the 
company. Regarding reintegration possibilities, the legislation distinguishes between permanent 
and temporary inability to perform the former job, and the possibility to return to an adapted job 
(travail adapté) or a different job (autre travail). Adapted job means that the content remains the 
same, but the working time and number of hours worked are modified. A different job means 
that the content of the job changes, as well as the working time and number of hours worked. 
With the agreement of the employee, the occupational physician can consult the employee’s 
general practitioner or specialist doctor, the mutuality doctor, another prevention counsellor 
specialised in psychosocial risks or ergonomics, for example, or the disability case manager. The 
occupational physician also evaluates the workstation and work environment. Finally, he or she 
decides which procedure fits the employee better (A, B, C, D or E). In total, the occupational 
physician has 40 days to go through the procedure. The employee can appeal the doctor’s 
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decision within seven days in the case of decision C or D. If the decision D is confirmed during the 
appeal within 31 days, it marks the end of the procedure. 
The third step is the design of the reintegration plan by the employer (within 55 days for decision 
A and a year for decision C). The employer can consult the employee, the occupational doctor 
and other relevant stakeholders (disability case manager, employee representatives, prevention 
counsellors). If a partial return to work is chosen, the occupational physician needs to contact the 
mutuality doctor, who will check if the job is adapted and if the employee can continue to receive 
incapacity or invalidity benefits. The plan contains detailed and concrete adjustments of the 
workstation, the number of hours worked, the work schedule, possible progression, and the 
duration of the plan. It also includes training that could be useful for the employee. The latter 
must agree with the plan within five days. If he or she does not agree, the reasons must be stated. 
A copy of the reintegration plan is sent to the occupational and mutuality doctors. If the employer 
declares that no reintegration plan is possible, he or she must justify this decision in a report. The 
fourth step is the implementation of the reintegration plan, if both parties have agreed to it. The 
occupational doctor follows up on the implementation and can propose adjustments to the plan 
if needed in the case of deterioration or improvement in the employee’s health condition. 
A reintegration procedure may end by a termination of the employment contract due to 
“medical force majeure”. This justification can be used in three configurations: if the employee 
is permanently unable to perform the job and no reintegration possibilities exist (decision D, or 
permanent work incapacity), if the employer cannot offer an adapted or a different job, or if the 
employee disagrees with the reintegration plan. A medical force majeure can now only be invoked 
if the employee has gone through a reintegration procedure, which was not the case before 2016. 
 
